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Abstract. We present a new approach to explicity link security require-
ments with the organization’s business vision. A conceptual framework
is presented, where the relationships between business vision, critical
impact factors and valuable assets (together with their security require-
ments) are clearly show. Evaluating this relationships and considering
also organization’s business drivers, it is possible to define a plan for pri-
oritizing security requirements primary required by organization’s busi-
ness.
1 Introduction
Security has long been a consideration for those responsible for computing sys-
tems. Over the years, the level of threat and the need for corresponding safe-
guards have varied, depending on the environment in which the systems were
deployed and the data they processed. However, the Internet marked the be-
ginning of a new social and commercial phenomenon. It also opened a door for
those seeking to electronically exploit others’ data and infrastructure for their
own purposes. A recent CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey has showed
that 56% of the respondents experienced unauthorized use of their computer sys-
tems in the past 12 months. The same survey also reported that the total losses
for 2005 were $ 130,104,542 for the 639 respondents that were willing and able to
estimate losses, in other words, $203.606 losses per respondent. The past decade
has also seen the introduction of legislation that often places a responsibility on
organizations to demonstrate a requisite level of care when handling computer
data.
The increasing concerns of clients, particularly in online commerce, plus the
impact of legislations on information security have compelled companies to put
more resources in information security. It is clear that senior managers in many
organizations are now expressing a much greater interest in information secu-
rity. Understanding and specifying what kind of security an organization need
is however a difficult task. Many underlying goals (why and what security is
needed) remain tacit within organizations requirements and end up being ar-
ticulated as specifications of the security control baseline (how security will be
achieved) without a clear rationale. The problem becomes more urgent when
more and more organizations are involved in collaboration and commerce. Be-
ing able to articulate security goals and requirement consistently, based on an
accurate view of existing security capabilities, and using shared understandings,
becomes much more important. Networked business will be difficult to function
if the organizations involved cannot agree: why security is necessary; the scope
it should cover and what each organization expects it to achieve.
The complexity of undertaking an enterprise wide view of security manage-
ment can be illustrated in the challenges facing chief security officers (CSO).
Often CSOs are tasked with ”securing” the organization, but may not be clear
on what that means. As a result, the CSO is often left to answers of very im-
portant organization questions without specific guidance:
– What needs to be secured? Why, and in what priority?
– How to ensure that people agree on the above issue?
– How will I know when the organization has been ”secured”? What will be
used to measure success?
We believe to answer the above questions, it is necessary to link the security
requirements with the organization’s unique business drivers. For a production
company, the availability of its production control system is of vital importance,
whereas for a financial service provider, it is important to protect the integrity of
its financial transactions. Different organizations have different business drivers,
which in turn determined their different requirements to security. This should
be taken into consideration while understanding and specifying security require-
ments. It is therefore important to develop techniques and instruments to help
stakeholders articulating the connection between security requirements and the
business drivers in a systematic way.
2 Formulating and Understanding Security Goals and
Requirements
A security requirement specification tells what should be secured and why. It
identifies the organizations’ needs with respect to security. Considere, for ex-
ample, the differences between the needs of a university and those of a cryp-
tographic organization. The university fosters scholarship and open research:
papers, discoveries, and work are available to the general public as well as to
other academics. The cryptographic organization, on the other hand, prizes se-
crecy. The university will need to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the
data, such as grades, on its systems. It might also want to ensure that the system
is available via the Internet so that students, faculty, and other researchers have
access to information. The cryptographic organization, though, will emphasize
confidentiality of all its work.
When an organization wants to secure its system, it must first determine what
requirements to meet. Given that organizations normally have limited resources
to protect its assets, it is equally important to determine which requirements
are more important and thus should be prioritized. To achieve this, we propose
to use a conceptual framework where security requirements are linked to the
unique business drivers of the organization in question. Figure 1 portrays the
conceptual framework. Business vision are high level business goals the orga-
nization has. Critical Impact Factors (CIFs) identify what will be the business
impacts if security requirements are violated. Valuable assets and their security
requirements are inventories of security requirements. Valuable assets and their
security requirements have an effect on the CIFs and the CIFs in turn impact the
accomplishment of the organization’s business vision. In other words, we can use
organization’s business vision to prioritize the CIFs, which further can be used
to prioritize the security requirements. To achieve that, three subsequent steps
need to be taken. Firstly we need to enumerate valuable assets and their security
requirements. Secondly, an organization’s CIFs and business vision need to be
defined. Thirdly, security requirements shall be linked with CIFs and business
vision. We will discuss them in detail.
Valuable assets and 
their security 
requirements
Critical Impact Factors Business vision
prioritize
impactimpact
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Fig. 1. Linking security requirements with business vision via CIF.
2.1 The business vision
Each organization has its own unique business vision that defines the very prin-
ciples of how the business wants to achieve its goals. This vision, moreover,
often changes over time to reflect changing circumstances. Notwithstanding this
diversity, scholars in business administration have identified certain “paterns”
in the business vision of leading firms. In this paper, we use the well-known
value disciplines identified by Treacy and Wiersema [8,9] as a frameworks for
understanding the business vision.
Treacy and Wiersema argue that there are three generic ways a business can
differentiate itself from the competition, which they call operational excellence,
customer intimacy, and product leadership. Each of these three value disciplines
aims at creating distinguishing value for customers in a different way. A company
striving for operational excellence focuses on offering its products with the least
possible hassle (usually, at the lowest cost) to its customers. A customer intimacy
company aims at delivering exactly what its customers want by investigating the
needs of a narrow market and customizing its offerings to this market. Finally,
a product leader aims at delivering radically innovative products that create an
unbridgable gap with the competition.
Each of the three value disciplines leads to a radically different operating
model for the company: the culture, processes, management systems and IT
systems of the company. For instance, while operational excellence calls for highly
standardized business processes, the customer intimacy discipline requires just
the opposite: to meet customer requirements, business processes should be as
flexible as possible. Security requirements should be likewise aligned with the
requirements imposed upon culture, processes and management systems by the
value discipline choosen.
2.2 Identifying the critical impact factors
When security incidents happen, they may lead to damage to organizations.
Critical impact factors (CIFs) are the indicators about what kind of damage the
security incidents incur to the organization. They can include those within the
control of the organization, as well as some that the organization may not be
able to fully control (e.g., legal liability, finance losses and reputational damage).
The identification activity of CIFs is also referred as business impact analysis
(BIA): it is important to remark the difference between BIA and risk analysis.
BIA identifies the critical business functions within the organization and
determines the effect of external and internal CIFs upon the various parts of
organization, using a combination of relevant literature study and specific case
studies in the organizations.
Risk analysis involves identifying the most probable threats to an organiza-
tion and analyzing the related vulnerabilities of the organization to those threats.
Figure 2 illustrate an example list of critical impact factors.
CIF
financial loss reputation damage
loss of 
productivity legal liability
Fig. 2. An example of Critical Impact Factors.
2.3 Selecting valuable assets and security requirements
The business vision can be used to guide the selection of valuable assets. Surely,
the assets that are critical for accomplishing the business vision are the valuable
ones for the organizations. For example, a financial service company that fo-
cuses on customer intimacy will consider its customer relationship management
(CRM) systems as extremely valuable, while a financial service company that
focuses at product leadership will likely value its systems for developing new
financial products even higher.
Information security has been defined as encompassing systems and proce-
dures designed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability 3 of an
organization’s critical information and technical assets. Information assets rep-
resent the data and information, in either physical or electronic from, that is
critical to the organization. Technical assets represent those assets that support
the storage, transmission, and processing of data and information and therefore
are important to transforming data and information to be used by the organi-
zation. People can be an asset to the organization as well for similar reason –
they can be a primary way of storing, transporting, or processing data.
So, IT security is about safeguard certain desired properties. The core of
computer and information security is widely regarded as the preservation of
three factors: confidentiality (ensuring that information is accessible only to those
authorized to access), integrity (safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of
information and processing methods) and availability (ensuring that authorized
users have access to information and associated assets when required) [3].
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Fig. 3. A simple ontology of asset and security property.
Figure 3 depicts a simple ontology of asset and the security properties that
are in the scope. Such an ontology can be used as a starting point to structure
assets and their security properties. It is a minimum set and can be extended. For
instance, some will include privacy issues like anonymity as a security property
too. Using such an ontology, the assets and their security properties can be
structured accordingly. Figure 4 gives an example.
3 some authorities treat communication security issues such as non-repudiation and
privacy related issues such as anonymity as additional aspects of security
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Fig. 4. An example of assets and their security properties.
2.4 Prioritizing security requirements
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Fig. 5. An example of linking asset security requirement with business vision
via CIFs.
To further elaborate the relations between security requirements and the
business vision, the connection between them can be established via the linkage
of CIFs. Figure 5 provides an example of such linkage for a production company.
In this example, the organization is stating that any compromise to ”availability”
of the ”control system” has ”critical impact” to ”loss of productivity”, which in
turn has ”critical impact” to the organization’s vision ”improve operational effi-
ciency”. The impact severity can be categorized according to the organization’s
needs. An example categorization can be critical impact, marginal impact, and
negligible impact. In this way, each security requirements can be connect its CIFs
and the CIFs further to business vision.
Using the impact diagram like figure 5, it is possible to categorize and pri-
oritize the different security requirements. Requirements that have ”critical im-
pacts” on CIFs, which have ”critical impacts” on business vision, should be
considered of most importance. These requirements shall be satisfied first if the
resources (time, money, manpower etc.) are limited. In this example, it means for
the production company, it is more important to mitigate threats to the control
system’s availability than for instance, threats to the control system’s confiden-
tiality. It is possible that one requirement may be linked to more than one CIFs.
When that happens the overall significance of that security requirement can be
determined by a number of ways. For example, one can choose the maximum
impact level, e.g. if control system’s availability not only ”critical impacts” on
loss of productivity but also has ”marginal impact” on reputation damage, the
overall impact should be ”critical impacts”. Alternatively, one can choose the
average impact level. The organization shall decide which combination methods
best reflects its situation.
The reason why we use CIFs to link critical assets and their security require-
ments with business goals is twofold. Business goals typically reside at strategic
level. When the business goals are outlined, the stakeholders do not normally
have a security focus in mind. The Critical Impact Factors on the other hand,
reflect the business implication when security is compromised. It is of course pos-
sible to directly connect assets’ security requirements with business goals. But
then the shift of focus from pure technical level security concern to strategical
level business concern seems abrupt. The introduction of CIFs makes the shift
smooth and the line of reasoning easier to follow.
Once the requirements are categorized and prioritized. Other techniques, like
attacks trees or misuse cases can be used to explore all possible threats and attack
paths that would lead to the violation of security properties. In this example,
it is to find out how the control system’s availability can be compromised. Our
approach is complementary to this line of work, in the sense that we provides a
business grounded rational for why certain security requirements are important
while others are not.
3 Related Research
There exists a number of security standards, among which COBIT (Control
Objectives for Information and related Technology) [2] and BS7799 [1] are of
particular relevance to our work. COBIT is an international de-facto standard
for information control and IT risk management, addressing IT governance and
control practices. It provides a reference business-oriented framework for man-
agement, users and control and security auditors. COBIT defines control objec-
tives but does not provide guidelines on how to reach the objectives. BS7799
(originally published in 1995) is strictly focused on IT security and it is divided
into two parts. The first part Code of Practice for Information Security Manage-
ment became an official ISO standard, ISO 17799, in 2000. It contains general
security guidelines including policies, practices, procedures, organizational struc-
tures and software functions. The second part Information Security Management
- Specifications became a ISO standard, ISO 27001, in 2005. It contains tech-
nical requirements. ISO17799/27001 addresses company’s security from a best
practice point of view, which does not provide any answer to why certain se-
curity mechanisms are in place for a particular organization. Both COBIT and
ISO17799 however, do not define guidelines on how to prioritize in a proper way
the company assets and their security properties.
Our approach is also related to the work of security requirement modeling.
Sinder and Opdahl [7] suggested to have negative use cases or scenarios in con-
nection with security. Yu and Liu [10] in their work shows actors and misactors
having contradictory goals in an extension of i∗ diagrams [4]. Links such as
”break” or ”hurt” can show how an attack prevents the legitimate users from
reaching their goals, or how countermeasures can thwart an attacks. This line
of work focuses on how to model threat, including the threat actors and their
attack paths. Our approach on the other hand, focuses on providing business ra-
tionale for explaining why certain security requirements exist in the first place as
well as explaining why some security requirements are more important than oth-
ers. Our approach can be combined with the modeling work. First, the security
requirements are ranked using our approach. Next, for the prioritized security
requirements, misuse case or attack trees [6] can be use to model how attacks
that will violate the security requirements could actually happen.
Finally, our work is also related to the work of security risk assessment. Tra-
ditionally, in risk assessment methodologies, e.g. OCTAVE [5] (Operationally
Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation), risk of each threat is de-
termined by the impact of the threat once it happens and how likely it will
happen [REF]. For the impact, a severity level (e.g. high, low or medium) is
assigned. What often happens is that the severity level is assigned based on the
person’s own experience without explicit rationale. Our approach can enhance
this process because it provides an explicit tie to the organization’s business
drivers.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we argued the necessity of making explicit the tie between secu-
rity requirements and the organization’s business drivers. A company like Google
that is making profit with online advertising would tend to keep its search engine
availability as high as possible, without taking too much care about data confi-
dentiality (thus is, they are public available with few clicks). On the other hand,
a financial entity that offers online servicing would be more focused on data
confidentiality than availability because possible legal acts brought by damaged
users could cost more than a temporary service shutdown. The difference is de-
termined by the underlying different business drivers the different organizations
have.
Further we proposed a conceptual framework to that aim. Three main ele-
ments are included in the framework, namely, business vision, CIFs and valuable
assets and their security requirements. The connection between business goals
and security requirements, once established, can be used to provide rational for
prioritizing security requirements. A number of issues need future work. We need
to define methods that help to come up with a proper set of CIFs. Also in the
face of contradicting business visions, proper guidelines should be given on how
to combine the results.
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